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Abstract
In the theory of programming languages, type inference is the process
of inferring the type of an expression automatically, often making use
of information from the context in which the expression appears. Such
mechanisms turn out to be extremely useful in the practice of interac-
tive theorem proving, whereby users interact with a computational proof
assistant to construct formal axiomatic derivations of mathematical the-
orems. This article explains some of the mechanisms for type inference
used by the Mathematical Components project, which is working towards
a verification of the Feit-Thompson theorem.
1 Introduction
Consider the following mathematical assertions:
• For every x in R, ex =
∑
∞
i=0
xi
i!
.
• If G and H are groups, f is a homomorphism from G to H , and a and b
are in G, then f(ab) = f(a)f(b).
• If F is a field of nonzero characteristic p, and a and b are in F , then
(a+ b)p =
p∑
i=0
(
p
i
)
aibp−i = ap + bp.
There is nothing unusual about these statements, but, on reflection, one notices
that substantial background knowledge and assumptions are needed to parse
them correctly. For example, in the first statement, we take it that the index
of the summation i ranges over natural numbers, or, equivalently, nonnegative
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integers. Hence i! is also an integer. Since x is explicitly flagged as a real
number, the expression xi/i! involves division of two different types of objects,
taking into account that any integer can be viewed as a real number. In the
second statement, G and H are groups, which is to say, each is a set of elements
equipped with a group operation and an identity element; so when we write that
a and b are in G, we really mean that a and b are elements of the underlying set.
The notation ab denotes multiplication in G, while the notation f(a)f(b) can
only be understood in terms of the multiplication in H . In the third statement,
p is a nonnegative integer (in fact, a prime number, since nonzero field charac-
teristics are prime). But unlike the summation symbol in the first statement,
here the summation symbol refers to addition in F . In the third statement,
(
p
i
)
is an integer, while ai and bp−i are elements of the field. How do we interpret
multiplication in that case? One way is to notice that there is a canonical map
from the integers to any ring with a 0 and a 1. Alternatively, any abelian group
can be viewed as a Z-module, which means that it supports scalar multiplication
by integers, with all the expected properties; and the additive part of a ring is
an abelian group.
Inferences like these are used not only to parse basic mathematical expres-
sions, but also to reason about them correctly. For example, some “multipli-
cations” and “additions” are commutative, and multiplication often distributes
over the corresponding addition. Common manipulations with summations de-
pend on such facts. Understanding mathematics presupposes the ability to keep
track of the various domains that objects belong to and variables range over,
as well as the relevant operations on those domains and their properties. Our
faculties for doing this are so ingrained that we are scarcely aware of the back-
ground knowledge we bring to the table when we read an ordinary mathematical
text.
The problem is that such background knowledge has to be brought to the
foreground when it comes to formalizing mathematics. Broadly speaking, formal
verification is the practice of using formal methods to verify correctness, such
as verifying that a circuit description, an algorithm, or a network or security
protocol meets its specification. In this article, I will be concerned, instead, with
the verification of mathematical theorems. To be sure, there is no sharp dis-
tinction between verifying mathematical statements and verifying claims about
hardware and software systems, since the latter are typically expressed in math-
ematical terms. But ordinary mathematical theorems have a special character,
and raise distinct issues and challenges.
Specifically, I will focus on interactive theorem proving, which involves work-
ing interactively with a proof assistant to provide enough information for the
system to confirm that the theorem in question has, indeed, a formal proof. In
fact, many systems actually construct a formal proof object, a complex piece
of data that can be verified independently. Systems with substantial mathe-
matical libraries include Coq [5] (including the Ssreflect extension [21]), HOL
[24], HOL light [28], Isabelle [37], and Mizar [25]. In September 2004, assisted
by some students at Carnegie Mellon, I verified a proof of the Hadamard/de
la Valle´e Poussin prime number theorem [3], using the Isabelle proof assistant.
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Since then number of nontrival theorems have been formalized, including the
four-color theorem [18], the prime number theorem [3, 30], the Jordan curve the-
orem [26, 33], Go¨del’s first incompleteness theorem [42, 38], Dirichlet’s theorem
on primes in an arithmetic progression [29], the Cartan fixed-point theorems
[9], and various theorems of measure theory [31, 35]. There are, moreover,
some interesting large-scale verification projects underway. Thomas Hales is
heading the Flyspeck project [27], which aims to verify a number of results in
discrete geometry, including the Kepler conjecture. Georges Gonthier is head-
ing the Mathematical Components project [17, 19], which aims to verify the
Feit-Thompson theorem. Fields medalist Vladimir Voevodsky has launched a
project to develop “univalent foundations” for algebraic topology, providing the
basis for formal verification in a theorem prover like Coq.
Checking the details of a mathematical proof is by no means the most inter-
esting or important part of mathematics, and formal verification is not meant
to serve as a substitute for mathematical creativity and understanding. But it
is generally recognized that the mathematical literature is filled with misstate-
ments, gaps, ambiguities, overlooked cases, omitted hypotheses, and so on, and
that the lack of reliability is problematic [36]. Moreover, an increasing number of
proofs today rely on extensive calculation, and there are currently no standards
to ensure that mathematical software is sound. Mathematicians always strive
for correctness, and formal verification is simply a technology that is designed
to support that goal.
Despite the achievements to date, however, formal verification is still not
“ready for prime time.” There is a steep learning curve to working with an
interactive theorem prover, and verifying even straightforward mathematical
results can be frustrating and time consuming. We need better libraries, au-
tomated methods, and infrastructure to support verification efforts. This is an
exciting time for a young and rapidly evolving field.
In this article, I will focus on one small aspect of formal verification, namely,
type inference. In the mathematical setting, the challenge of type inference,
roughly speaking, is to keep track of the kinds of objects that appear in a
mathematical statement and put that information to good use. What is common
to the previous examples is that in each case the relevant information can be
inferred from context:
• In the expression “a is in G,” the object of the word “in” is expected to
be a set.
• In “ab,” multiplication takes place in the group that a and b are assumed
to be an element of.
• In “xi/i!,” one expects the arguments to be elements of a common struc-
ture, for which a division operation is defined.
Type inference thus involves not only inferring type information, but also infer-
ring data and facts from type considerations. Of course, type inference is central
to the theory of programming languages [39], and many of the ideas and meth-
ods that have been developed there have been transferred to the mathematical
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setting. But, as will become clear, mathematical type inference has a distinct
flavor. Here I will focus primarily on the approach to type inference used in the
Mathematical Components project, which relies on a proof language, Ssreflect,
and the Coq theorem prover.
In Section 2, I will consider what is desired from a mathematical perspective.
In Section 3, I will discuss some of the underlying axiomatic frameworks, and
dependent type theory in particular. In Section 4, I will describe some of the
mechanisms in Coq that are designed to meet the challenges posed in Section 2.
In Section 5, I will describe the way some of these mechanisms are used in the
Mathematical Components library, and in Section 6, I will briefly indicate some
alternative approaches.
2 Mathematical type inference
One hallmark of modern mathematics is the tendency to identify mathematical
objects as elements of algebraically characterized structures. Such structures,
and classes of such structures, can be related in various ways:
• Structures in one class may be viewed as elements of a broader one. For
example, every abelian group is, more generally, a group, and every group
is, more generally, a monoid. Sometimes the inclusions are obtained by
taking reducts, which is to say, ignoring parts of the structure. For exam-
ple, the additive part of a ring is an abelian group, while the multiplicative
part is a monoid.
• A particular structure or a structure in one class can often be embedded
in a larger structure. For example, the integers can be embedded in the
reals, and every integral domain can be embedded in its field of fractions.
• Uniform constructions can be used to build elements of one class of struc-
tures from elements of another. For example, the units in any ring form
a group, under the associated multiplication; the set of automorphisms of
a field (or those fixing some chosen subfield) form a group under compo-
sition; any metric space gives rise to a topological space determined by
the metric; the field of fractions of any integral domain is a field; and the
quotient of a group by a normal subgroup is again a group.
What makes this perspective useful is that it allows one to transfer insights and
results gained from one domain to another, and apply background knowledge
and expertise uniformly in different settings. The challenge for interactive proof
assistants is to reap these benefits.
There are various ways that algebraic methods promote efficiency:
• They allow us to reuse notation. For example, one may wish to use the
symbols 0 and + with respect to the integers, the reals, and arbitrary
rings.
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• They allow us to reuse constructions. For example, summation
∑
i∈I ai in
the integers, reals, and an arbitrary ring can be viewed as instances of the
same construction, namely an iteration of the corresponding addition. In
fact, various “big” operations, including multiplication, logical operations
of conjunction and disjunction, lattice operations of meet and join, and so
on can be viewed as iterations of an associative operation in an arbitrary
monoid.
• They allow us to reuse facts. Various identities involving big operations
can be viewed as instances of general laws that can be instantiated in
the different settings. For example, some identities involving summations
presuppose that the addition is commutative. Other identities hold in the
presence of a multiplication that distributes over addition. We implic-
itly recognize that such facts hold at various degrees of generality, and
instantiate them as appropriate.
Any proof assistant that is designed to formalize contemporary mathematical
arguments should support these types of reuse.
In the theory of programming languages, type inference allows users to omit
information that can be inferred from context. For example, if we write f(i)
and i is known to range over the integers, we can infer that f is a function from
the integers to some other domain. Various kinds of “polymorphism” allow one
to reuse symbols and code across different domains. In the context of formally
verified mathematics, there are really two types of information that can be
inferred:
• data: for example, the appropriate multiplication in an expression a · b, or
the appropriate summation operation in an expression
∑
i∈A f(i).
• facts: for example, the fact that (a · b) · c is equal to a · (b · c), when the
multiplication in the relevant structure is associative.
In the next section, we will see that in certain formulations of logic, these two can
be understood as instances of a common phenomena. In other words, inferring
a fact can be viewed as inferring a special kind of data, namely “evidence” or
“the fact” that the associated claim is true.
To summarize, in interactive theorem proving, type inference may be invoked
when the system parses an expression, but also when the user applies a lemma,
or searches for a lemma to apply. The goal of type inference is to allow the
user to omit information systematically when such information can be inferred
from context. Not only does this save time and energy and reduce tedium, but
it also ensures that the expressions we type look like the mathematics we are
familiar with, lending support to the claim that our formalizations adequately
“capture” informal mathematical practice.
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3 Dependent type theory
In order to verify mathematical proofs in a given domain, one has to first choose
a formal axiomatic framework that is flexible enough to model arguments in that
domain. Experience from the last century has shown that the Zermelo-Fraenkel
axioms of set theory provides a remarkably robust foundation for mathematics.
Indeed, the Mizar system [25], which has perhaps the most extensive mathe-
matical library, is based on an extension of ZF known as Tarski-Groethendieck
set theory.
But, in set theory, every object is a set, meaning that the axiomatic frame-
work does not distinguish between numbers, functions, structures, and other
objects. For the purposes of type inference, it is often useful to have such dis-
tinctions built into the underlying formal system. A number of proof assistants
today, including HOL [24], HOL light [28], and Isabelle [37], are based on for-
mulations of higher-order logic like Church’s simple type theory [8]. One starts
with basic types, such as a type nat of natural numbers and a type bool of
boolean truth values, and adds constructors for forming new types. The most
important of these are function types: whenever A and B are types, so is A→ B,
intended to denote the type of functions from A to B. One can also allow, for
example, product types A × B, denoting the type of ordered pairs from A and
B. Most proof systems have additional mechanisms to support the definition
of common mathematical data types and structures, and allow “polymorphic”
variables ranging over types.
The problem with simple type theory, however, is that it is too simple, since
ordinary mathematical structures often depend on parameters. For example,
for each n, Rn is a vector space, and for every n ≥ 1, the integers modulo n
form a ring. Thus one may wish to have types
• list A n, denoting sequences of objects of type A, with length n; and
• Zmod n, denoting the ring of integers modulo n.
In dependent type theory, types can depend on parameters in this way. Notice
that such a move tends to blur the distinction between types and terms. For
example, in list A n, the first argument is supposed to denote a type, whereas
the second argument is supposed to be a term of type nat. In some presentations
of type theory, this is achieved by having special types, called universes, whose
terms are also construed as types (see, for example, the presentation of Martin-
Lo¨f type theory in [47, Section 7.1]). Contemporary presentations more often
take types to be inhabitants of a third level of syntactic objects, known as
“sorts” or “kinds” (see [4]). The specific details need not concern us here; only
the fact that terms as well as types can depend on parameters that are again
terms or types.
In dependent type theory, the type A → B of functions which take an argu-
ment in A and return a value in B can be generalized to a dependent product∏
x:A
B(x), where B(x) is a type that can depend on x. Intuitively, elements of
this type are functions that map an element a of A to an element of B(a). When
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B does not depend on x, the result is just A → B. Similarly, product types A× B
can be generalized to dependent sums
∑
x:A
B(x). Intuitively, elements of this
type are pairs (a, b), where a is an element of A and b is an element of B(a).
When B does not depend on x, this is just A × B.
In the next section, we will consider one particular theorem prover, Coq.
Coq’s underlying logic is a dependent type theory known as the calculus of
inductive constructions, or CIC [12], which extends the original calculus of con-
structions due to Coquand and Huet [11]. The calculus of inductive construc-
tions has four distinguishing features:
• It is a powerful and expressive dependent type theory.
• It incorporates the “propositions as types” correspondence.
• It is constructive, in that every expression in the system has a computa-
tional interpretation.
• The computational interpretation of terms is used in type checking.
• Type checking is decidable.
These features are not to everyone’s taste, and we will see in Section 6 that
other proof assistants can reject any or all of them. I will elaborate on each, in
turn.
One striking feature of the Calculus of Inductive Constructions is that there
are only two basic type-forming operations: dependent products and inductive
types. We have already discussed dependent products. Inductive types allow one
to define structures that can be characterized as the closure of a set under some
basic operations, like the natural numbers, or lists and trees over a type. But,
in the CIC, the construction is general enough to include dependent sums, as
well as to interpret basic logical notions, like conjunction, disjunction, universal
and existential quantification, and equality. In fact, the system has the logical
strength of strong systems of set theory [49].
In order to interpret logical operations in terms of type-theoretic construc-
tions, the CIC relies on what has come to be known as the Curry-Howard
“propositions as types” correspondence. The point is that logical operations
look a lot like operations on datatypes. For example, in propositional logic,
from A and B one can conclude A ∧ B. One can read this as saying that given a
proof a of A and a proof b of B of B one can “pair” them to obtain a proof (a,
b) of A ∧ B; or given the “fact” a that A holds, and the fact b that B holds, one
obtains the fact (a, b) that A ∧ B holds. Moreover, from the fact that A ∧ B
holds, one can extract the fact that A holds, and, similarly, B. If you replace
A∧B by A× B, this is nothing more than a characterization of the product type.
In other words, if we posit a new collection Prop of types and take the product
constructor to map elements A : Prop and B : Prop to A×B : Prop, the rules
governing products for elements of Prop are exactly the desired logical rules for
conjunction.
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Under this correspondence, implications A→ B are just instances of function
types, and bounded universal quantifiers ∀x : A. B(x) are just instances of the
dependent product construction. In other words, a proof of ∀x : A. B(x) can
be viewed as a procedure which, given any object a : A returns a proof of
B(a). This explains Coq’s notation forall x : A, B x for dependent prod-
ucts. Similarly, the logical construction ∃x : A. B(x) is just an instance of the
dependent sum. Using inductively defined types, given any type A one can form
IA(x,y) : Prop which, intuitively, denotes the proposition that x is equal to y
as elements of A.
One can take the propositions-as-types as expressing a deep insight into the
nature and meaning of logical operations [34, 48]. But one can just as well view
it as a notational convenience which, moreover, allows a proof assistant to treat
logical and mathematical operations uniformly. For example, one can take the
transitivity of inequality on the natural numbers, leq_trans, to be a term of
type
∀x:nat, y:nat, z:nat, x ≤ y → y ≤ z → x ≤ z.
This last expression, in turn, it a term of type Prop. One can view leq_trans
not just as the fact that less-than-or-equal is transitive, but also as a function
which, given elements x, y, and z in the natural numbers as well as the facts that
x ≤ y and y ≤ z, return the fact that x ≤ z. Thus, given a : nat, b : nat,
and c : nat, the term leq_trans a b c denotes the implication a ≤ b →
b ≤ c → a ≤ c. Moreover, we can express that H is the fact that a ≤ b by
writing H : a ≤ b, in which case leq_trans a b c H denotes the implication
b ≤ c → a ≤ c.
The propositions-as-types correspondence is particularly popular as a foun-
dation for constructive mathematics, where assertions are expected to have di-
rect computational significance. Every term in Coq can be viewed as a compu-
tational object, subject to evaluation. For example, if pi0 and pi1 denote the two
projections from a product type A × B, the a term pi0(a, b) can be “reduced”
or “evaluated” to a. In fact, every term in Coq can, at least in principle, be
reduced to a canonical normal form. In particular, if t is a closed term of type
nat, then t reduces to a numeral. Coq, moreover, makes use of this computa-
tional interpretation when checking types. For example, If C(x) is a type that
depends on a value x of type A, the system can recognize that C(pi0(a, b)) is
the same type as C(a).
The decidability of type checking amounts to the fact that given a term,
t, and a type, T, the type-checker can, deterministically, decide whether or
not t has type T. This is clearly a useful property to have, though we will
see, in Section 6, that it imposes strong restrictions. Under the propositions-
as-types correspondence, the decidability of type checking takes on additional
significance. Suppose P is a term of type Prop, expressing, for example, Fermat’s
last theorem. Then a term t of type P is a proof that P is true. Proving Fermat’s
last theorem thus amounts to constructing a term of type P, and the decidability
of type checking implies that such a term can be recognized, algorithmically, as
a valid proof.
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4 Type inference in Coq
Now that we have a sense of Coq’s axiomatic framework, let us explore some of
the mechanisms the system offers to address the challenges raised in Section 2.
Generally speaking, type inference is triggered when the system is called on
to determine the type of a term, or to check that a term has an appropriate
type, when some information has been left implicit. But because dependent
types depend on the values of their parameters, inferring a type can entail
inferring such values. Recall that in Section 2 we distinguished between two
types of information that can be inferred, namely, data and facts. With the
propositions-as-types correspondence in place, inferring a fact—such as the fact
that multiplication is associative—is a matter of inferring a value of a type
P, which is in turn of type Prop, where P expresses the expected associativity
property.
We will consider three principal mechanisms. Implicit arguments allow users
to systematically leave information out of an expression when this information
can be inferred from context. Coercions allow users to cast, implicitly, objects
of one type to objects of another. Finally, canonical structures let the user
register certain objects as components of a larger structure, providing useful
information to the type inference process.1
It will be helpful to illustrate these with a running example. The following
definition declares a new type, group:
Record group : Type := Group
{
carrier : Type;
mulg : carrier -> carrier -> carrier;
oneg : carrier;
invg : carrier -> carrier;
mulgA : forall x y z : carrier,
mulg x (mulg y z) = mulg (mulg x y) z;
...
}.
According to this type declaration, group is a record type, consisting of a carrier,
a multiplication, an identity, and an inverse. These are assumed to satisfy the
requisite axioms, such as the associativity of multiplication. If G has type group,
that is, G : group, then the components of G are carrier G, mulg G, oneg G,
and so on. Conversely, given elements my_carrier, my_mul, my_one and so on
of the right type, the term Group my_carrier my_mul my_one ... denotes the
corresponding group.
1For more detail than is provided below, see Coq’s online reference manual. All three
mechanisms were initially introduced to Coq by Amokrane Sa¨ıbi [32, 40, 41], who credits the
idea of using implicit arguments in the theorem proving context to Peter Aczel. Implicit ar-
guments were further extended by Hugo Herbelin and Matthieu Sozeau. Canonical structures
received little attention until they were revived and used aggressively by Gonthier; see, for
example, [17].
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Notice that we are relying on dependent type theory here. The type group is
a classic example of a dependent sum, since, for example, the type of the second
component, carrier -> carrier -> carrier, depends on the value carrier
of the first component. The arguments of the corresponding projections bear
the associated dependences. For example, the term mulg, which picks out the
the second component, has type forall G : group, carrier G -> carrier
G -> carrier G, a dependent product.
Notice also that the proposition-as-types correspondence is being put to good
use. For example, the type of the fifth component, mulgA, is the proposition
that mulg is associative. Assuming G : group, the term mulgA G has type
forall x y z : carrier G,
mulg G x (mulg G y z) = mulg G (mulg G x y) z
which is itself a term of type Prop. Thus mulgA G denotes the fact that mul-
tiplication in mulg G is associative, a fact that can be applied to elements of
the carrier of G just as in the example of leq_trans above. In this way, the
propositions-as-types correspondence provides a natural and convenient way to
think of the group structure as including not only the relevant data—the carrier
of the group and group operations—but also the relevant properties.
In a context where we have G : group, g : carrier G, and h : carrier
G, the term mulg G g h represents the product of g and h under the multi-
plication operation of G. The implicit arguments mechanism in Coq allows us
to write mulg _ g h, replacing the first argument by an underscore. Doing so
means that we expect the type inference algorithm to infer the value of that
argument from context, by finding a solution to the constraints imposed by the
fact that the resulting term should be well typed. The algorithm proceeds by
instantiating the first element with a variable, ?. The term mulg ? then has
type carrier ? -> carrier ? -> carrier ?. Since this term is applied to
g : carrier G, to get the types to work out the system has to solve a simple
unification problem, namely, instantiating ? to unify carrier ? with carrier
G. Thus ? is instantiated to G, and the algorithm has inferred the relevant
parameter. With this in mind, one can introduce a new notation:
Notation "g * h" := (mulg _ g h).
This enables one to write g * h for multiplication in any group, allowing the
group in question to be inferred from the type of g.
In this example, the implicit argument mechanism was used to infer a pa-
rameter in the application of a function, mulg. But the mechanism can be used
just as well to infer parameters during the application of a lemma. For example,
recall the transitivity lemma leq_trans from the last section. This takes five
arguments—three natural numbers, x, y, z, and the facts x ≤ y and y ≤ z—and
returns the fact x ≤ z. Suppose we declare the first three arguments to be
implicit. Then given H1 : a ≤ b and H2 : b ≤ c, the term leq_trans H1 H2
has type a ≤ c. Moreover, when we are building a proof interactively in Coq, if
we apply leq_trans H1 to a subgoal a ≤ c, type inference similarly infers the
missing arguments and leaves the us with the goal b ≤ c.
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Coercions are commonly used in programming languages, for example, when
adding a real and an integer triggers the coercion of the integer to a real. In
the context of mathematical theorem proving, coercions have other uses as well.
In our running example, one would ordinarily write g : carrier G to specify
that g is an element of the carrier of G. Writing g : G instead yields an error,
because the system expects something of type Type on the right side of the
colon, and G has type group. But declaring
Coercion carrier : group >-> Type.
informs Coq that the function carrier can always be used to coerce a group to
a type. If one then enters g : G, the algorithm finds itself facing a group on the
right side of the colon but expecting a type, and readily inserts the coercion.
The last feature that we will discuss, canonical structures, provides an inverse
to coercion, of sorts. In the example above, we used the carrier function to
coerce a record structure to one of its projections. Canonical structures makes
it possible for the type inference algorithm to pass in the other direction, and
recognize a particular object as the projection of a larger structure. To illustrate,
suppose we define
IntGroup := Group int addi zeroi negi addiA ...
thereby declaring the integers with addition to be an instance of a group. Some-
what perversely, this will allow us to write mulg IntGroup i j instead of i +
j, when we have i j : int. Less perversely, this will allow us to apply general
theorems about groups to this particular instance. But what happens now when
we write i * j? This expression is shorthand for mulg _ i j. After instanti-
ating the first argument to a variable, ?, the type inference algorithm is faced
with the unification problem carrier ? = int, and gets stuck. Declaring
Canonical Structure IntGroup.
registers the fact carrier IntGroup = int with the system for use in type
inference. One can view this as a “hint” to the unification process [2]. Now
when the type inference algorithm gets stuck as above, it can appeal to a table
of such hints, and use the relevant one to recognize that the integers can be
viewed as the carrier of the IntGroup structure. The algorithm then replaces
int by carrier IntGroup and solves the unification problem.
The mechanisms just described are not exceedingly complicated, but we will
see in the next section that they are remarkably robust with respect to the
challenges posed in Section 2. Canonical structures can, moreover, be used in
clever ways to trick the type inference algorithm into carrying out various kinds
of useful automation [23].
To summarize, type checking is triggered when the user enters an expression
or applies a lemma, possibly leaving some arguments and facts implicit. Coq’s
type inference engine has four resources at its disposal to fill in the remaining
information:
1. unification can be used to infer implicit arguments;
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2. coercions can be inserted to resolve a type mismatch;
3. the unification algorithm can refer to a database of unification hints to
solve unification problems involving a projection of a canonical structure;
and
4. when all else fails, the algorithm can simplify terms or unfold definitions
according to the CIC’s computational interpretation of terms, and then
retry the previous steps.
Generally speaking, implicit arguments can trigger arbitrary instances of higher-
order unification, which is known to be undecidable [14]. So, at best, type in-
ference can only aim to search a reasonable fragment of the space of possible
instantiations for an implicit argument. And even within decidable fragments,
unpacking definitions and unfolding terms can easily lead to combinatorial ex-
plosion. Nonetheless, Coq’s type inference algorithm consists, essentially, of
iterating the steps above, relying on heuristics to limit the possibilities in the
fourth step.
5 The mathematical components library
This section provides a brief indication of some of the ways that the mechanisms
for type inference discussed in Section 4 have been used towards Gonthier’s for-
malization of the Feit-Thompson theorem [15], which asserts that finite groups
of odd order are solvable. These examples only scratch the surface; for more
detail, see [6, 17, 18, 21, 22].
Recall that Coq’s logic is constructive. In contrast, many principles and
methods that are commonly used in contemporary mathematics are not con-
structively valid. For example, constructively, one cannot assume the law of
the excluded middle, or prove the existence of an x satisfying a property P by
assuming there is no such x and deriving a contradiction. Extensionality fails:
one cannot, in general, prove that two functions f and g from A to B are equal
by proving that f(x) = g(x) for every x. Choice fails as well: even if one has
proved that for every x in A there is a y in B such that some property holds,
one cannot assume that there is a function f that picks out such a y for every
x.
On the other hand, these properties generally hold in finite domains. Since
the Feit-Thompson theorem is an extended exploration of properties of finite
groups, one would like to take advantage of these features when they are avail-
able. Thus, in the Ssreflect library, there are general structures for types with
a decidable equality relation (that is, ones where the relation can be computed
by a function returning a boolean value of “true” or “false,” ensuring that it
satisfies the law of the excluded middle); finite structures; and structures that
can be equipped with choice functions. For example, one can define a structure
for types with decidable equality as follows:
Record eqType : Type := EqType
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{carrier : Type;
rel : carrier -> carrier -> bool;
ax : forall x y, (x = y) = (rel x y)
}.
In the last line of the record, the expression rel x y of type bool is coerced
to the proposition that the value of this expression is equal to true. In other
words, ax is the proposition that rel x y holds if and only if x = y. Declaring
carrier to be a coercion allows one to write x : T whenever we have T :
eqType. Implicit arguments allow one to use the notation x == y in place of
rel T x y whenever x and y are elements of the carrier of such a T. Finally,
canonical structures allow one to associate the relevant boolean equality relation
with the natural numbers, so that one can write x == y when we have x y :
nat, as well. (This is a slight simplification of the implementation in the Ssreflect
library [17].)
Section 2 noted that “big operations” such as
∑
,
∏
,
⋂
,
⋃
,
∧
,
∨
can all be
viewed as instances of iterations of an associative binary operation. But such
operations come in many different flavors: one can sum over a list, a numeric
range, or a finite set, and these summations will satisfy different properties
depending on whether the underlying structure is a semigroup, an abelian semi-
group, or a ring. Ssreflect comes with an overarching “bigop” library, and once
again type inference plays a key role in making it work [6].
Type inference is also used to manage algebraic class inclusions (between
rings, commutative rings, fields, and son on) and algebraic constructions: for
example, the set of n by n matrices over a ring forms a ring when n > 0, and
the set of polynomials over a commutative ring again forms a commutative ring.
Type inference ensures that the relevant algebraic facts are readily available,
and allows a uniform use of notation [17, 20]. Definitions in the Ssreflect library
have been carefully chosen so that if G and H are groups of the same type (more
precisely, subgroups of some ambient group type), then the quotient notation
G / H makes sense; but when H is in fact a normal subgroup of G, as in the
usual construction of a quotient group, G / H is a group with all the expected
properties [22]. For another example, when a group G happens to be abelian, it
is often treated as a Z-module and written additively. So, for example, one can
write g *+ n for scalar multiplication of g by n whenver g is an element of the
group and n is a natural number. Type inference is used to mediate between
these two “views” of an abelian group.
Type inference also helps with mundane mathematical conventions. For
example, Section 2 noted the conflation of groups with sets. If G and H are
subgroups of an ambient finite group, and A is a subset of that group, then
G ∩ H and C_G(A) (the centralizer of A in G) are both groups. But they are also
just sets with the ambient group operation; an element x is in G∩ H if and only
if it is in G and H, and x is in C_G(A) if and only if x is in G and commutes
with every element of A. Type inference mediates between these two views of a
construction—that is, of yielding both a group and a set—allowing one to apply
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lemmas involving groups in some instances and lemmas involving sets in others.
For another example, a homomorphism between groups G and H is a function
between G and H equipped (using a record type) with additional properties.
Coercion allows one to use ordinary function notation with morphisms, such as
f x and f ◦ g. In the other direction, canonical structures automatically infer
the fact that f ◦ g is a homomorphism when f and g are, giving f ◦ g a similarly
dual status as function and morphism.
Canonical structures can even be used to make sense of mildly abusive math-
ematical notation. For example, if U and W are subspaces of a vector space V ,
it is common to write U +W for set {u+ w | u ∈ U,w ∈ W}. Mathematicians
will often say “U +W is a direct sum” when U and W have trivial intersection,
ignoring the fact that this is a property of the pair (U,W ) which is impossible
to read off from the U +W alone. Gonthier has shown, however, that canonical
structures provide a convenient way of supporting this abuse of language [20].
6 Limitations and other approaches
The mechanisms supporting type inference that were described in Section 4 are
not the only ones available in Coq. In particular, Coq now has a “type class”
mechanism [44]. Type classes and canonical structures serve similar purposes,
but whereas canonical structures are handled within the type inference loop
described at the end of Section 4, the type class mechanism collects constraints
that are passed to a separate inference engine at the end of the process. Spitters
and van der Weegen [45] have experimented with type classes in the context of
mathematical type inference, with positive results.
But one may wish to stray even further from Coq’s mindset. Recall some of
the key features of that proof assistant:
• An elaborate type theory is built in to the underlying axiomatic frame-
work.
• Using the propositions-as-types correspondence, data and facts are han-
dled in the same way, so theorems can be applied to arguments and hy-
potheses just as functions are applied to arguments.
• The underlying logic is constructive, and every term has computational
significance.
• Type checking makes use of the computational interpretation of terms.
• Type checking is decidable.
These are very strong constraints, which interact with each other in subtle ways
and place strong restrictions on the way mathematics is represented and carried
out. Not every proof assistant adopts such a framework. In fact, most reject
the third, allowing classical reasoning that is ubiquitous in contemporary math-
ematics. Similarly, the propositions-as-types correspondence is usually linked
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to constructive theories, though there is no reason that it cannot be adopted in
classical frameworks as well.
Although the mechanisms for type inference described in this article scale
reasonably well, their use in real mathematical settings can be complex and
delicate. Moreover, when an expression fails to typecheck, error messages from
the system are often uninformative, and it can be frustrating and difficult to
diagnose the problem. There are, moreover, rigid limitations to dependent type
theory that stem from the commitment to keep type checking decidable. This
is so because type checking algorithms are constrained to focus on syntactic
structure, without incorporating background knowledge. For example, if list
A n denotes the type of vectors of elements of A of length n, and we have t :
list A (0 + n), then, in Coq, t also typechecks as an element of list A n.
In other words, Coq recognizes these two types as being the same. But entering
t : list A (n + 0) yields a type error; Coq refuses to recognize that list A
(n + 0) is the same as list A n. What is going on is that addition in Coq is
defined by recursion on the first argument, so that the the term 0 + n reduces
to n under the computational interpretation. But the fact that n + 0 is equal
to 0 is a mathematical fact, and there is no general way to incorporate arbitrary
mathematical information in type checking while maintaining decidability.
Still, some have explored ways of making type judgments more flexible while
maintaining decidability [1, 7, 46]. An alternative is to give up the decidability
of type checking, and accept the fact that some type judgments will require proof
from the user. This is the path chosen by NuPrl [10] and PVS [43]. Yet another
alternative is to jettison type theory altogether, and move to an axiomatic sys-
tem like set theory, which offers maximum flexibility while relinquishing all the
benefits of types; and then try to recapture some of those benefits by adding
an extra layer of automation to register and manage domain information out-
side the axiomatic theory. Such “soft typing” mechanisms can be found, for
example, in Mizar [25].
This article has focused on the modeling of mathematical language from the
point of view of contemporary interactive theorem provers. Others [13, 16] have
come at the problem from the perspective of natural language processing. In
the long run, it seems likely that the various approaches will converge.
Inferring domain information is essential to modeling mathematical language
and reasoning. Gonthier’s work on the Feit-Thompson theorem shows that it is
possible to model full-blown algebraic reasoning in an interactive proof systems.
But other approaches should also be explored, and continued experimentation
and innovation is needed to develop better support for verifying ordinary math-
ematical proofs.
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